After the launch of Ethereum 2.0, this question surfaced: Will the controversial EIP1559 trigger a fork?


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Compilation: Free and easy @巴比特

Original title: Will EIP1559 cause Ethereum to fork?

EIP1559 as a fee improvement proposal has caused huge controversy in the Ethereum community. People like Ethereum co-founder Vitalik and others support the introduction of EIP 1559 in Ethereum as soon as possible, while communities like miners have shown strong opposition, such as .

In this regard, Tim Roughgarden, a computer science professor from Columbia University, conducted a more objective economic analysis of EIP 1559. He also pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal. Despite this, there are still large miner communities and development communities. Opinions are divided.

What is EIP 1559? Read these articles:

Today, after Tim Roughgarden released the EIP 1559 economic analysis report, Vitalik, who supported the EIP 1559 proposal, commented:

“Tim Roughgarden just released the long-awaited EIP 1559 review report! Let’s work hard to get this important economic upgrade into Ethereum soon.”

So what exactly does Professor Tim Roughgarden’s analysis report say? The following are the 10 conclusions published on twitter (readers who are interested in reading the full 58-page report can read here:

  1. There is no transaction fee mechanism (including EIP-1559 and other mechanisms) that can greatly reduce the average transaction fee. The persistently high transaction fee is a scalability issue, not a mechanism design issue.
  2. EIP-1559 can reduce the difference in transaction fees and the delay experienced by some users through the flexibility of variable size blocks.
  3. EIP-1559 can improve the user experience through the simple cost estimation of the “best price” outside the period of rapid demand growth (but when there is a rapid increase in demand, the user experience cannot be improved).
  4. Under the EIP-1559 rule, the short-term incentives for miners to implement the agreement as expected are as strong as the “first price auction” mechanism.
  5. Under the EIP-1559 rule, the game-theoretic obstacles to double-spending attacks, censorship attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and long-term revenue maximization strategies (such as basic fee manipulation) seem to be as strong as under the first price auction mechanism.
  6. EIP-1559 can at least moderately reduce the ETH inflation rate by burning transaction fees.
  7. It is easy to estimate costs and burn costs. These two seemingly orthogonal goals are inseparable due to the threat of off-chain agreements.
  8. Alternative designs include paying basic fee income to miners in future blocks instead of burning them, and replacing variable user-specified tip fees with fixed hard-coded tip fees .
  9. The basic fee update rules for EIP-1559 are somewhat arbitrary and should be adjusted over time.
  10. Variable-size blocks will trigger new, but expensive attack vectors: that is, overwhelming the network through a series of blocks of the largest size.

It also concluded:

Can EIP-1559 improve the current transaction fee mechanism of Ethereum? The biggest potential benefits of this proposal are:

(1) Simple cost estimation can be achieved outside the period of rapid demand growth; (2) Due to the increased flexibility of block size, the difference in transaction costs is small; (3) Protocol deviations and off-chain agreements Game theory robustness; and (4) Reduce inflation due to burning costs.

The main risk of implementing EIP-1559 is just like the problems caused by other major Ethereum changes: implementation errors, or forks caused by some participants’ refusal to change.

In addition, it will also bring additional complexity to the consensus layer, because every time the network is upgraded, other parameters must be adjusted and unpredictable downstream consequences. The additional risk peculiar to EIP-1559 also includes the possible hostile attitude of miners (due to burning transaction fees, they will lose income). The other is that variable block size will bring new attack vectors, although it will be very expensive.

People will hold different opinions on whether the benefits of adopting EIP-1559 are enough to exceed the risks it may bring. Those who insist that “the original fee market rules have no major problems” may be more willing to stick to the status quo. For those who believe that the consensus layer innovation should continue to be the central part of the future of Ethereum, the view that supports EIP-1559 is very Strong.

The translator personally believes that the controversy of EIP-1559 may be no less than Bitcoin block expansion. If it is not handled properly, it may cause a new fork.